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Abstract 
 
Bazin, Cavell and other prominent theorists have asserted that movies are 
essentially photographic with more recent scholars such as Carroll and Gaut 
protesting. Today CGI stands as a further counter, in addition to past objections 
such as editing, animation and blue screen. Also central in debates is whether 
photography is transparent, that is, whether it allows us to see things in other times 
and places. I maintain photography is transparent, notwithstanding objections 
citing digital manipulation. However, taking a cue from Cavell—albeit one poorly 
outlined in his work—I argue this is not so much because of what photography 
physically is, but because of what “photography” has come to mean. I similarly 
argue digital technologies have not significantly altered what cinematic media “are” 
because they have not fundamentally modified what they mean; and that cinema 
retains a photographic legacy, even when it abandons photographic technologies to 
digitally manufacture virtual worlds. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the post-WWII era, a number of prominent scholars suggested that film is 
essentially photographic (e.g., Bazin 1951; Cavell 1979). Since then individuals such as 
Noël Carroll (1996, 2008), Berys Gaut (2010) and Ian Jarvie (1987) have charged it is not, 
and for reasons not easily challenged. Without disputing this, I aim to highlight the 
extent to which movies retain a photographic legacy, even in an age when CGI can be 
used to fabricate virtual worlds. In other words, I hope to show that the photographic 
legacy continues to define what movies mean to us, even in cases when photographic 
technologies are left behind.  
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Though anticipating some resistance to this thesis, I take for granted that most 
accept that photography is historically linked to the development of cinema. I therefore 
presume that a thorough understanding of cinema entails a discussion of photography, 
and in examining the latter, I defend the transparency thesis. That is, with thinkers such 
as George Santayana (c. 1900-1907), André Bazin (1951), Stanley Cavell (1979) and 
Kendal Walton (1984), I argue that photographs allow us to see things in other times 
and places, notwithstanding objections citing digital manipulation. However, taking a 
cue from Cavell—and one poorly laid out in his work—I argue this is not so much 
because of what photography physically is, but because of what “photography” has 
come to mean. I similarly maintain digital technologies have not radically shifted what 
cinematic media “are” to us because they have not fundamentally altered our concepts 
of movies; and this, in part, because filmmakers continue to emulate older, established 
modes of production in CGI invented worlds, not to mention cartoons, though I attend 
only briefly to the latter. 
I begin by explicating my approach, which considers what photography is— 
whether digital or photochemical—by examining what it has historically meant to us. 
While defending the transparency thesis, I dispute some prominently cited bases for it. 
Specifically, I argue that proponents of the transparency thesis and the related indexical 
view, which holds photographs are imprints of the world, tend to overemphasize the 
physical nature of photography and neglect cultural-historical meaning. I also argue that 
adversaries do the same, and further that it does not make sense to advance claims 
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about the ontology of photography—a human, cultural product—apart from historical-
cultural interpretations of what it is and what it means. After this, I consider the extent 
to which meanings of photography enter into our understandings of what cinematic 
media are. I focus on how digital technologies are pressing conventional concepts of 
film, yet also how art forms retain historical lineages and therewith established 
meanings about what they are.  
 
 
Photography and a Plea for History 
The indexical view of photography, as Pamola Atencia-Linares (2012, p. 19) 
summarizes without fully endorsing it, holds that photographs “bear a causal relation to 
their content,” much “like shadows and fossils.” This means that content “in 
photographs depends causally, and counterfactually, on the object that was in front of 
the camera,” and also that content “is not essentially dependent on the photographer’s 
intentions.” Defenders of this position hold that compared to paintings, which are 
interpretive, photographs are not products of imagination. Susan Sontag (1973), to give 
one example, writes that  
a photograph is not only an image (as a painting is an image), an 
interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, something directly stenciled 
off the real, like a footprint or a death mask. While a painting, even one 
that meets photographic standards of resemblance, never does more 
than state an interpretation, a photograph never does less than register 
an emanation (light waves reflected by objects)—a material vestige of its 
subject in a way that no painting can be (p. 120). 
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Numerous defenders of the indexical view advance comparable ideas, emphasizing 
physical processes involved in making photographs. Key claims are that the 
photographic image depends counterfactually on what was in front of the camera and 
that images are produced through automated mechanical processes and consequently 
not subject to interpretation.  
Building on this kind of outlook, some also argue that photographs are 
transparent, meaning they are windows allowing us to see into times and spaces 
removed from our own. Santayana suggests that photography gives us the “unalloyed 
fact” (c. 1900-1907, p. 397), and Bazin observes that seeing things by means of motion 
photography is akin to seeing them through “mirrors” (1951, p. 97). Walton (1984), who 
is most famous for advancing the transparency thesis, offers a comparable analogy, 
comparing photographs to “telescopes and microscopes [that] extend our visual 
powers” (p. 255). He adds that with the assistance of photography, we can “see into the 
past” (p. 251). Cavell (1979) echoes the point, writing that “[t]he reality in a photograph 
is present to me while I am not present to it; and a world I know, and see, but to which I 
am nevertheless not present […], is a world past” (p. 23). That the photographed world 
“does not exist (now) is its only difference from reality” (p. 24). What is common to 
these accounts is that they all hold that to see a photograph of, say, an actress is to see 
the actress herself, as opposed to a mere representation of her. As with advocates of 
the indexical view, moreover, transparency proponents maintain that photographs 
register emanations from the world, upon which they counterfactually depend.  
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Though sympathetic to such accounts, and while I defend them later, I see a 
problem with how many are constructed, namely, that explanations focus on how 
photographs are physically made, less on what “photography” means, which is related 
but not identical to the material processes. Interestingly and at the same time, some 
contesting the transparency thesis do the same. Gaut (2010, p. 89), for instance, 
highlights problems in Walton’s account by means of illustrations emphasizing physical, 
causal relations. Gaut, in one case, describes two clocks, with the hands of clock B radio 
linked to those of A. This means that B’s movements are automatic, mechanical 
facsimiles of A’s. As such, they counterfactually depend on A’s, and are not a product of 
human interpretation. In a second illustration, he talks about an indistinguishable, 
mechanically produced plaster cast of an artifact. Gaut points out that few would claim 
that in seeing Clock B, they see A, or in seeing the cast, they see the original, even 
though this should follow from Walton’s account. Although I accept Gaut’s criticisms of 
Walton, I hope to show later that a transparency account emphasizing what 
photography has historically meant is more robust. 
A separate line of attack acknowledges a relation between the transparency 
thesis and meaning, particularly as influenced by culture, but then questions it on such 
grounds. For example, Aleksandra Alcaraz (2015), drawing on André Rouillé, suggests 
the transparency thesis is a questionable belief that emerged as a counter to the “crisis 
of truth” that surfaced “after the Romantic period” when “doubt in objectivity 
appeared” (pp. 7-8), with photography seeming to offer one avenue out. The 
Digital Fabrication and its Meanings for Photography and Film Page 6 of 26 
observation itself may be correct, and might form a basis for a critique of a culture that 
attributes greater objectivity to outcomes divorced from human judgment; and it is 
indeed because photographs are products of automatic mechanical processes that 
many have given them greater epistemic value than paintings. Statistical analysis is 
comparable insofar as p-values of .05 or .001 are automatically adopted without critical 
judgment by the scientific community; using other values, even if appropriate to 
research, is rejected as subjective bias. It cannot be denied, moreover, that erroneous 
views have arisen for cultural reasons. This happened, for instance, when people clung 
to geocentric models partly because of religious beliefs that located humans at the 
center of the universe, although it is worth adding that such models can accord with 
data (see Crippen, 2010, pp. 484-485, 501, fn. 2). At the same time, however, no 
comparable mistake has occurred in significant degree with photography, whether 
photochemical or digital, for experts and most educated laypeople have more or less 
known how it works all along. Moreover, it does not make sense to advance ontological 
claims about photography—a human, cultural product—apart from historical-cultural 
interpretations of what it is.  
Evan Cameron (2004) makes this point generally of artifacts. Paraphrasing the 
philosopher and archeologist R. G. Collingwood, Cameron asks us to suppose 
that an archaeologist at work upon a site between Tyne and Solway were 
to uncover yet another elongated section of shaped rock, aligned with 
others, that might seem to have been part of the wall. What must the 
archaeologist do to come to understand what has been uncovered? 
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The archaeologist must acknowledge that the object is an artefact that was 
constructed by human beings in the past to serve as a means towards ends 
they had wished to accomplish. […] 
 
To learn how an artefact was intended by its makers to mean (to be used), 
therefore, an archaeologist must engage unexceptionally in the 
evidentiary and open-ended task of coming to imagine better how its 
makers had tried to solve the historically specific problem they had faced 
by making it as they did (2004, pp. 6-7). 
 
This highlights a difference between investigations of human artifacts versus physical 
nature per se. With the solar system, accounts likely improve as we focus more on 
physical nature alone and leave culturally based interpretations behind, however 
unavoidable they may be. With a Roman artifact, however, physical analysis in the 
absence of cultural-historical explanation yields little. After all, knowledge of what the 
artifact is entails a sense of how it was used and what it meant to the culture that 
produced it.  
The same holds with photographs, which are artifacts. Consequently those either 
defending or attacking transparency accounts based on what photography physically is 
while neglecting cultural significance adopt equally mistaken approaches. So too do 
those challenging transparency accounts because they are cultural. This is something 
like noting that a sharp tool intended by a past culture as a writing instrument would 
have been more effective as a weapon, and then concluding therefore that it is not in 
fact a writing instrument, but instead a weapon.  
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Photography and Meaning 
 
As early as Santayana and continuing with others such as Bazin, Cavell and 
Walton, theorists have argued that photography allows us to see things that exist in 
other time and space. In this section I offer a defense of the position, and in the next 
consider what it might mean for cinema, especially in light of recent digital advances. 
However, rather than a protracted discussion, I here provide an abbreviated illustration 
drawn from an empirical experiment (see Crippen, 2015, 2016). In addition to brevity, 
the experiment helps show that the question of what photographic media are is a 
question about their meaning.   
The experiment begins with two paintings of Jesus in which he looks different. 
When asked whom the paintings are of, the response is always “Jesus.” Following this 
first step, people are presented with photographic stills with two different actors 
playing Jesus and the same question. In this second instance, people hesitate to say the 
stills are of Jesus, instead stating they are of the performers playing him. This is 
noteworthy because there is no record of what Jesus actually looked like, which means 
the performers in the photographs could, in principle, have also modeled for painters.  
Cavell’s (1979) analysis cast light on why people respond differently to the 
paintings and photographic stills. In his own example, he argues that upon encountering 
a building in a painting, we do not take its existence for granted, recognizing it may be a 
product of imagination. If we conclude it exists, it is typically because of external 
information, as when recognizing it as a well-known site such as the White House. In 
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Cavell’s words, it accordingly “only accidentally makes sense” to ask “what lies behind it, 
totally obscured by it” (p. 23). However, the same question has historically been 
appropriate in the case of photographs because people have historically understood 
“photography” to mean something showing things that exist or once did.  
Testifying to this is the fact that many objected that something unphotographic 
was misleadingly presented as photographic when the Giza pyramids were repositioned 
to better fit a 1982 National Geographic cover. In the words of an editor in chief from 
the same publication, a “firestorm” resulted (Goldberg, 2016, n.p.), and similar reactions 
have occurred more recently when digitally doctored images have been presented as 
photographs (see Cooper, 2007; Safi, 2016). This indicates that upon encountering what 
we understand to be a photograph, as opposed to a photorealistic painting or CGI 
image, people have overwhelmingly taken for granted that the building or whatnot in it 
exists or once did and that the image has not been manipulated post hoc. Upon learning 
that an image is doctored, people have, at least in the past, questioned the legitimacy of 
calling it a “photograph.” Paintings have a different meaning, and are not taken as truth 
claims about what they portray, and this helps explain why people unhesitatingly 
identify Jesus in the paintings: they at least tacitly recognize the images might be 
products of imagination. So even if models were used, the paintings are principally of 
Jesus and of models accidentally, and we only feel confident models were used through 
information not in the painting, for instance, comments in an artist’s journal. By 
contrast, the models are internally and perhaps analytically related to photographs in 
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that we understand that things called “photographs,” by definition, show things that 
exist or once did.1 
Notice also that the fact that photographers use different film stocks, focal 
lengths, lighting and so forth—all standard objections to the transparency thesis (see, 
for example, Carroll, 1996, pp. 47, 57-58)—does not alter this meaning. That is, 
regardless of these variations—unless perhaps so extreme as to destroy 
recognizability—people consistently behave as if photographs of friends and family are 
a means by which we see them. This makes sense because the aforesaid variations 
could be introduced if we peered at the performers through a telescope, darkened 
pitted glass, in sunshine versus incandescent light, and in such cases few would claim 
they are not seeing them. Lack of retinal disparity and motion parallax are not 
objections either since both would drop out if we gazed at models while motionless with 
one eye close, and once again few would deny we are seeing them. One feature that 
has, however, historically made people question the legitimacy of using the term 
“photograph” is post hoc manipulation such that images are not produced through 
automatic mechanisms. This highlights that the physical processes by which 
photographs are made relate to what we understand photography to mean. However, 
examining the physical nature of photography alone will not tell us much about its 
meanings, nor what it is to us. Gaut’s earlier cited examples in fact indicate that physical 
 
1 Some of the explanation here given paraphrases and elaborates on that offered in 
Crippen 2015, pp. 84-85; 2016, p. 170. 
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parameters alone do not dictate how we encounter things, for people do talk as if they 
see loved ones by means of photographs; and the experience of seeing through time is 
palpable for those who have discovered, for instance, precious 8mm home-movies of 
grandparents from decades past. However, it is unlikely people would experience radio-
linked clocks or indistinguishable plaster imprints of artifacts in comparable ways. 
How much does digital photography change this? Against what some maintain, I 
argue very little. Thus, for example, Alcaraz (2015) writes that although “analog and 
digital images seem … very similar or even the same, when perceiving a digital image we 
can never be sure that it is true” (p. 1). She adds: “We can no longer believe in the 
truthfulness of digital images, since we can never be sure to what extent they represent 
the world around us[…], or whether they might be simulacra” (p. 11). The claim itself is 
of course true, but it was also true before the advent of digital photography, with 
doctored images around almost as long as photography has existed. The National 
Geographic cover is one example. A variety of others abound. Early on pointillist and 
impressionist images were rendered with photographic technologies. Advertisers 
airbrushed makeup models before the advent of photoshoping. Moreover, Atencia-
Linares (2012) observes a protracted history of blending photographs to create the 
impression of entities that do not exactly exist, as when Wanda Wultz mixed a feline 
face with hers. Atencia-Linares also discusses artists creating images by passing light 
over film emulsions, in effect drawing with light, and adds that this “is indeed a 
photographic process” (p. 22).  However, this is arguably a misuse of words, and the 
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process is more accurately characterized as “photochemical” because almost nobody 
will perceive the result as a photograph, just as many will question whether they are 
really encountering a photograph if they see a human-feline face, or behold an image, 
then learn portions were digitally altered in significant ways, superimposed or removed. 
In short and to repeat, calling something a “photograph” has historically meant making 
a tacit truth claim about objects seen by means of it, namely, that they exist or once did. 
When this is drawn into doubt, so too is the legitimacy of using the word “photograph.”  
Having said this, digital technologies have added new means of trickery, even if 
trickery itself is nothing new. Barbara Savedoff (2008), in a balanced assessment, writes: 
“In a world where digital manipulation—digital collage—has become the norm, we may 
simply come to assume that a photograph has been altered if it is at all challenging to 
read it as straight” (p. 137; see also Benovsky, 2014, p. 722). However, while the 
threshold that challenges is increasingly lower, digital cameras are predominately 
employed as their photochemical predecessors were: to capture the world. Hence we 
still take digital recordings of misdeeds as evidence, whereas paintings have never been 
accepted. In legal proceedings, perhaps, we would wish to verify digital photographs, 
but this would also be the case with photochemical images if doubts about authenticity 
existed. That digital photographs are taken as evidence also explains the surge of selfies 
with celebrities or at famous sites. 
To understand  something as “photographic” is still to tacitly accept a truth claim 
about what it shows, which is why, for instance, Reuters fired a top photo-editor and 
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removed Adnan Hajj’s photographs from its site after some were found to be digitally 
manipulated (see Cooper, 2007). Digital media have, to be sure, made it easier to 
manipulate results post hoc. For example, people might easily brighten eye color in 
selfies, but this is only a more ubiquitous variation of what has occurred all along, as in 
airbrushed glamor shots. For this reason, the meaning of “photography” is perhaps 
changing and may depart widely from currently established meanings in the future. 
However, so far it has not changed in significant degree—hence the uproar over Hajj’s 
images or the more recent banning of climbers from Nepal for producing doctored 
images of an ascent of Mount Everest (see Safi, 2016), something that would not have 
happened had a painter rendered a portrait of them at the summit. The possibility of 
manufacturing photographic-looking products was always there; digital technologies 
just make it more effortless.  
 
Movies and Meaning 
 
Casablanca (1942), excepting a few animated sequences with maps and the like, 
is a film produced by means of motion photography; and according to the conception of 
photography advanced through the Jesus example, this implies that when we see Ingrid 
Bergman and Humphrey Bogart through the screen while viewing the film, we see 
performers who once lived, wearing garments that actually existed, doing things they 
did on past movie sets. When Bergman smiles, when Bogart lights a cigarette, we 
witness events that really occurred. Thus while engaging us with a fictional story, the 
Digital Fabrication and its Meanings for Photography and Film Page 14 of 26 
movie also confronts us with a world that is anything but fictional—a world we can see 
without it being present in our space. In this regard, at least, Casablanca is within the 
domain of motion photography, and to that extent, arguably transparent. However, 
many films are obvious counterexamples. In spite of this, I still want to argue that 
photography remains connected to what film means, indeed, even in cases when 
photographic technologies are largely abandoned. 
Perhaps the most obvious counterexample is cartoon animation. When we 
screen scenes from “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” in Disney’s Fantasia (1940) we do not 
see anything that ever existed before the camera. Cavell says the projected world is a 
world of the past, a world that does not exist now, and that apart from this, “[t]here is 
no feature, or set of features, in which it differs” (1979, p. 24). Yet reacting to the first 
edition of The World Viewed, Alexander Sesonske (1974) responds that every feature 
differs in the case of cartoons: “Neither the space nor the laws of nature are the same” 
(p. 564). The events in “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” do not closely approximate anything 
we would see in the world, and “there is no past time at which these events either did 
occur or purport to have occurred” (Sesonske, 1974, p. 564). Cartoon animation raises a 
clear objection to those either applying the transparency thesis to film or arguing 
movies are photographic, as Bazin and Cavell claim. Animation also raises questions 
about the purported importance of realism in cinema—by which I just mean that things 
look real, even if stories are preposterous, as in many superhero and sci-fi flicks. 
Animated cartoons obviously do not manifest this kind of realism, but nonetheless 
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captivate. Few laugh when Bambi’s mother gets shot. Moreover, films departing even 
further from both realism and photographic technologies can be made. One could, for 
instance, use the scratch techniques of Len Lye to render abstract images onto celluloid 
by hand, and then forgo the step of photographically mass-producing the finished result. 
While this perhaps would not count as “a movie,” regarding it as an instance of “film” or 
“cinema” is perfectly intelligible. 
In addition to all this, there are many “middle-cases” that challenge the notion 
that film is either photographic or transparent. When we see dinosaurs in Jurassic Park 
(1993) or gigantic creatures in Avatar (2009), we see a range of entities that never 
existed in front of the camera. The images may be partly photographic, as when human 
performers flee digitally constructed beasts. Hence the end product is not the 
unadulterated result of photographic automatism. So Gaut (2010), among others, is 
right when he says in reference to CGI that “cinematic art now deploys a possibility that 
painting already possesses, since it does not require some independently existing object 
in order to create expressive content” (p. 50). But while technically correct, this is 
nothing new to cinema. Over a century ago, audiences saw colored bursts of hand-
tinted gunfire in shootouts in The Great Robbery (1903). A culminating scene from 
Anchors Aweigh (1945) pairs Gene Kelly with Jerry the mouse, blending live action with 
cartoon animation, and Zelig (1983) combines elements from different photographic 
worlds, inserting Woody Allen into old footage with Adolph Hitler. In the original Star 
Wars movies (1977, 1980, 1983), Harrison Ford retreats from weapons fire he never 
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actually encountered. Forest Gump (1994) goes further, albeit this time with the aid of 
digital technologies: not only is Tom Hanks’ image introduced into archival footage with 
John F. Kennedy, but the brightness of the pixels around Kennedy’s mouth are 
manipulated, making movements better match lines provided by screenwriters.  
Gaut (2010) adds that “traditional film is ontologically realistic,” insofar as it is of 
things that were and events that actually happened, “but digital film is not in all cases” 
(p. 68). Only traditional film is not always ontologically real, as most of the above 
examples illustrate. In uncounted movies and for a long time, we have seen things that 
did not exactly happen, and not merely as a result of special effects, but also through 
montage or editing. Suppose, to borrow from Vsevolod Pudovkin (1926), that a man is 
filmed, 
…falling from a [fifth-story] window into a net, in such a way that the net 
is not visible on the screen; then the same man is shot falling from a 
slight height to the ground. Joined together, the two shots give in 
projection the desired impression [of a man falling from an appalling 
height] (p. 85). 
 
In the individual shots we here see events that actually happened, but not in the 
combination of the two. The man did not plummet five stories. “The catastrophic event 
... is the resultant of two pieces of celluloid joined together” (p. 85). 
So a few things to note: in the digital era, film is often not fully photographic and 
consequently not properly transparent, yet it almost never has been in its century plus 
history. The question I want to address is the extent to which the advent of digital 
filmmaking and especially CGI has changed what movies are to us; and while the claim 
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that film is essentially photographic is untenable, the position, especially as developed 
by Cavell, highlights an important point: that ontological questions about film relate to 
or are the same as questions about what film means to us. Cavell suggests just this in 
the first pages of the World Viewed when he explains that he came to see that “the 
answer to the question ‘What is the importance of art?’ is grammatically related to, or is 
a way of answering, the question ‘What is art?’” Import relates to significance and 
meaning, and questions about something’s important are historical quandaries.  
History of course changes, and meanings evolve. Once film was something you 
“shot.” The earliest films were, in fact, composed of a single shot. Later, shots were 
strung together, but largely as a matter of convenience—due to a scene change or 
because the scene’s length exceeded that of the reel and so on. It was not long, 
however, before editing became an aesthetic device. It was used to create continuity 
(and in some later cases, discontinuity), to structure scenes, to moderate mood and 
tempo and as a means of constructing events not actually recorded on film; it became 
an expository device (e.g. establishing shots), a narrative device, a way of building 
suspense and tension and a way of conveying simultaneously occurring events, as when 
cutting between fleeing outlaws and a pursuing posse. Editing changed how films were 
made and how cinema functioned as an expressive medium. Films, Pudovkin (1926) 
would say, are “not shot but built, built up from the separate strips of celluloid that are 
raw material” (p. 24). “The foundation of film art is editing” (p. 23). “Every object must, 
by editing, be brought upon the screen so that it shall have not photographic, but 
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cinematographic essence” (p. 25). Whether editing makes for cinematographic essence 
is a matter of debate, and one that Pudovkin is likely to lose today, but his basic 
observation that editing changed how films are made and how they communicated to 
audiences, that is, his assertion that editing shaped what films and filmmaking have 
historically become and therefore what we understand film to mean, is a claim not 
easily disputed.   
Editing is one tendency that remains constant throughout most of the history of 
filmmaking. Another longstanding constant—albeit less so—is that makers have tried to 
create the appearance of reality, cartoons and abstract films being exceptions. This has 
sometimes involved counterfeiting reality, but notice it is the appearance of reality that 
has been counterfeited. In superhero movies and sci-fi fantasies, for example, the 
overwhelming aim is to make preposterous and fictional events appear as they might if 
they actually happened. “Explicit artifice is,” as Cavell observes, “quite rare; not just 
rare, but specialized” (1979, p. 196), as in the case of the partly animated dream 
sequence in Vertigo (1958), where the departure from photographic realism is 
intentionally obvious. Most of the time such departures are avoided, and when 
filmmakers employ artifice, they do so with the hope of making it invisible. If an airplane 
flies across the screen, and it is obvious that it has been digitally inserted, then the 
special effects department has likely not succeeded in its job. The conspicuousness of 
artifice is here its failure.  
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It is clear, then, that pre-digital and digital filmmakers have both overwhelmingly 
endeavoured to create the appearance of reality, whether everyday or fantastical. 
Sometimes doing so involves counterfeiting it, as in cases just discussed, but also in 
more recent instances such as Rogue One (2016) where CGI is used to a significant 
extent. At the same time, cameras remain prevalent in this movie and others precisely 
because creating the appearance of reality with them is less labour intensive, more cost 
effective and usually just more convincing. Furthermore, motion photography has an 
influence even in cases when not used. It is felt distinctly, for example, in cartoons since 
animators import editing techniques from motion photographic filmmaking. A lesson 
here is that art forms do not abandon historical legacies even when relinquishing old 
modes of production. 
The photographic legacy indeed remains in digitally constructed virtual worlds. As 
John Mullarkey (2009) notes: “lens flare—an artefact of ‘conventional’ filmmaking that 
was once avoided but eventually became a stylistic cliché of the 1960s and 1970s—is 
these days reproduced artificially” in computer-generated productions (p. 54). This, he 
goes on to explain, 
 
…is one attempt to emulate the imperfections of the optical in order to be 
real—its flaring, its blurriness. Indeed, the optical and analogical are 
inherently limited (one can only move so fast, one can only go so high in a 
crane shot), and the shortfall from perfection, no matter how curtailed by 
effort, is also the index of material power. It is the weightlessness of CGI—
the ability to see anywhere in focus and move anywhere at speed—that 
fails to convince us because it offers no material resistance, no material 
freedom (p. 195). 
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Gaut (2010) elaborates on the same point: 
What is striking about the notion of photorealism is that it does not 
employ a comparison of the image to how a real object would look to 
provide a standard of realism […], but rather compares the image to a 
photograph of an object. This notion of realism is, then, a derivative one. 
The use of the photograph as the standard is illustrated by the 
introduction by digital animators of such things as film grain, motion blur 
… and lens flare into digital images. These are not things that accompany 
our normal seeing of an object, but are artefacts of photography. Often 
the standard of photorealism is set by the traditional photograph, rather 
than the digital one. For instance, film grain is a feature of traditional 
film, because of the silver salt deposits used, but does not occur in digital 
photographs […]. Other features employed in digital animation are 
common to traditional and digital photography: motion blur occurs 
because the exposure time of a shot is sufficiently lengthy that the object 
has discernibly moved during it; and lens flare happens when some light 
from a light source bounces away from the lens, instead of going through 
it. In the case of digital animation, there is no film grain, no motion blur 
(the represented objects are constructs, rather than independently 
existing), and no lens flare, since the lens is a “virtual” one, being merely 
a point of view onto the constructed digital world (pp. 66-67).  
 
This is to say, graininess, blur, lens flare and the like make the experience of watching 
CGI films even more removed from what we would see if we witnessed events in person 
since such phenomena would be absent. They are nonetheless added, to re-quote 
Mullarkey, in an “attempt to emulate the imperfections of the optical in order to be 
real.” That is, they are added because they are a part of photochemical filmmaking and 
photography, which has ubiquitously been taken to have privileged access to reality. At 
this point in time, moving images accordingly seem less real without these 
imperfections, and this because of the earlier history of photochemical filmmaking. 
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This illustrates, once again, how the photographic legacy remains in film even 
when it abandons photographic technologies. It suggests, in other words, that 
photography is not easily subtracted from what films mean to us and how they are 
made—in short, what they are. Discussions about the making of Avatar (2009) illustrate 
the point in detail. The moviemakers digitally manufactured lens flare and blurriness; 
they limited depth of field and added the appearance of overexposure—all unnecessary 
in CGI. The production team, moreover, endeavoured to make the director and 
audience feel as if conventional cameras were employed. Joe Letteri, a visual effects 
supervisor, explained in a 2010 documentary that a system was set up to allow the 
director to behave as if on “a live action stage.” Rob Legato, a virtual cinematography 
consultant, added: “And the camera can do anything. It can be a crane, it can be a 
steady-cam, it can be all just purely handheld. ... It’s basically as close to live action as 
one can get in a CG invented world.” Notice that while the virtual camera can “do 
anything,” the makers of Avatar mostly imitated constraints of conventional cameras, 
and fabricated optical imperfections linked with them. In terms of performance capture, 
they limited themselves similarly, with director James Cameron remarking in a 2010 
interview that they took a human performance “with no diminishment whatsoever, and 
then added to it,” for example, by introducing features of fictitious alien species. So 
when asked “what percentage of the actor’s performance came through in the final 
character, [he] say[s] 110%.”  
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Recently digital technologies have been used in even more extraordinary 
manners. Facial performance capture, in combination with a body double, was 
employed to create a young version of Arnold Schwarzenegger in Terminator Genisys 
(2015). Similar techniques were used to resurrect Peter Cushing from the dead to play 
his 1977 character Moff Tarkin in Rogue One. At the same time, barring circumstances 
like these and that of Avatar, conventional cameras and recording devices remain an 
easier and more effective method of creating the appearance of reality than digitally 
constructing minute ripples of muscle and subtleties of line, shadow, tone and countless 
other alterations undulating in the human face. This is evidenced by the fact that 
filmmakers avoid such techniques most of the time because using them is laborious, 
expensive and often not that convincing. Moreover, Schwarzenegger and Cushing’s 
faces were impassive because of their roles and thus easier than usual to construct, and 
performance capture was still used, meaning actors were essential. 
 Many filmmakers currently bypass the camera when, due to costs or feasibility, 
they are unable to produce some kind of event in front of the camera in a way that 
looks photo-real, and notice that the makers of Rogue One used old footage—not CGI—
from the movie made 30 years earlier when out-takes were available for some of the 
fighter pilots. Though one might debate the credibility of many computer-generated 
effects and movies that rely heavily on them, it seems that a desire for the visual 
appearance of reality is often the very thing that drives filmmakers away from the 
camera. It is also a large part of what keeps them attached to it: the camera is still the 
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most reliable and generally effective means of producing the appearance of reality, and 
this may not change for some time to come. Cameras with optical lenses—and not 
CGI—remain overwhelmingly ubiquitous even after the introduction of digital 
technologies. Filmmakers, in short, still largely aim to achieve the same results as they 
did before digital technologies became common; and though images are typically 
recorded digitally these days due to cost, ease of editing, manipulability and more, 
cameras with optical lenses are still the primary way that performances and events are 
captured, and even when they are digitally constructed, the overwhelming aim is to 
make them appear photographic. For such reasons, digital technologies have not 
radically altered what movies “are” to us, or more accurately, what they mean.  
Meanings are not, to be sure, disconnected from technologies, so that 
filmmaking and photography would not mean what they do if not for the automated 
mechanical processes and unprecedented ease with which images can be made to show 
the world. However, meanings are not solely determined by technologies, much less by 
philosophers. Far too many philosophers neglect this last point, including even 
Wittgenstein, whose supposed examples of everyday language were not everyday but 
schematized and one might say, essentialized (see Cameron, 2004). Realism, a standard 
established in cinema because of its development out of photographic technologies, 
remains a mainstay. It is what people often expect and a part of what movies mean to 
them, even to the point that imperfections in old ways of doing things are intentionally 
introduced to digitally constructed images. Filmmakers continue to rely on optical 
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cameras, and even when digitally producing fabricated, virtual worlds, cinema retains a 
legacy from photographic traditions. 
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